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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 8, 1986

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record

JEFFREY T. BERGNER, STAFF DIRECTOR
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The Honorable Kenneth Adelman
 Director
 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 U.S. Department of State
 Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Ken:

As you know, after eight years of being deferred, issues related to the non-ratification of the fatally flawed, unequal SALT II Treaty are now once again the primary order of business before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. SALT II Treaty compliance issues such as legislated compliance with the MIRV/ALCM sub-limits will also be on the Senate Floor in mid-July, when the FY 1987 Defense Authorization Bill is up for consideration. The President has stated that the Soviets are already quite close to the MIRV/ALCM sublimits of SALT II. They may indeed be above these sublimits, as the following questions suggest.

The Director of ACDA is the only senior U.S. Government official responsible for verification judgments, and such judgments will necessarily play a crucial role in the Senate SALT II debates, both in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and on the Floor. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for unclassified verification judgments from you on the following SALT II questions, all of which are derived from the Defense Department's series Soviet Military Power, and other entirely unclassified sources:

1. Verification Crisis

To what extent has the U.S. loss of the Space Shuttle and several other launch vehicles and payloads, and the indefinite space launch stand-down, created a crisis in U.S. capabilities for SALT monitoring and National Technical Means of verification?

- a. Was there a gap in U.S. coverage by National Technical Means after the Soviet Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident, as has been reported?

b. Please provide confidence levels for pre-stand-down NTM verification and monitoring capabilities, and current NTM capabilities.

c. Has the U.S. ever faced such a verification crisis before?

2. Maskirovka

Is Soviet Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception ("Maskirovka") of strategic forces deliberate interference with U.S. National Technical Means of SALT verification, and therefore a Soviet SALT I and SALT II violation?

a. If so, why has this not been stated in Presidential Reports to Congress on Soviet SALT Violations as a general, broad violation? (Only Soviet encryption of telemetry and camouflage of missile/launcher relationships have been reported.)

b. Has the Soviet Union used radio-electronic warfare to try to jam U.S. NTMs?

c. When and how successful was the jamming?

3. CCD Requires Worst Case Estimates

The CIA has stated in unclassified form recently that: "Since the SALT I Agreement of 1972, Soviet encryption and concealment activities have become more extensive and disturbing...the Soviet Program [i.e. of strategic Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception--Maskirovka] is extensive and pervasive... [it] makes detection of non-compliance considerably more difficult ...much of the ambiguity [i.e. in U.S. Intelligence about Soviet SALT violations] is a direct result of data denial...these two Soviet activities [i.e. concealment and encryption, and deception] impede our ability to verify the Soviet Union's compliance with its political commitments to SALT II..."

Does the Soviet CCD program specifically impede U.S. ability to detect and monitor Soviet:

a. deployment of rail-mobile SS-24 MIRVed ICBM launchers,

b. Soviet launch of SLBM submarines,

c. Soviet initiation of sea trials for SLBM submarines?

d. Has Soviet CCD ever led to U.S. miscounts of Soviet ICBM and SLBM levels, and were these miscounts under-estimative?

e. Has Soviet CCD ever caused the U.S. to fail to detect Soviet mobile missile deployment, submarine launches, and submarine sea trials?

f. Does the Soviet CCD program require conservative or worst case estimates of Soviet non-compliance activity, due to U.S. Intelligence uncertainties? Please give confidence levels in each case.

4. Possibility of Currently Unlocated MIRVed ICBM Launchers

On page 27 of the Soviet Military Power 6th edition of April 1986, the Defense Department states: "The SS-X-24 deployment in a rail-mobile mode could begin as early as late 1986... Early preparations for the deployment of the SS-X-24 are already underway." As the President stated in his January 1985 SDI White Paper, the Soviets are "introducing systems whose status and characteristics are more difficult to confirm." Could three or more camouflaged, or concealed rail-mobile MIRVed SS-24 ICBM launchers even now in mid 1986 be operational?

a. Could three or more rail-mobile MIRVed SS-24 ICBM launchers even now be operational deceptively housed in apparent passenger or freight rail cars? Please provide confidence levels.

b. Would deployment of three MIRVed SS-24 launchers put the Soviets over the SALT II ceiling of 820 MIRVed ICBMs?

c. Did it take 11 years, from 1974 to 1985, for the U.S. to confirm the camouflaged and concealed covert deployment of the mobile SS-16 ICBM?

d. Did it take over 2 years, from 1975 to 1977, for the U.S. to detect the camouflaged and concealed covert initial deployment of the mobile SS-20 IRBM?

e. Have any covert, concealed, or deceptive SS-20 bases ever been detected by chance?

f. Have some known SS-20 bases not been detected at all by National Technical Means, or after delays?

g. Why does the Joint Chiefs of Staff Military Posture Statement for FY 1987 state that the "441" SS-20s "Includes 36 launchers currently unlocated"?

h. Can the U.S. rule out with high confidence the possibility of current or impending rail-mobile deployment of 3 or more camouflaged, concealed or deceptively based SS-24 MIRVed ICBM launchers?

i. How long could it take to detect such covert SS-24 rail-mobile ICBM deployments? Again, please provide confidence levels.

j. The throw-weight of the SS-25 is twice that of the SS-13, yet the single warhead of the SS-25 is less than half the throw-weight. The best explanation of this phenomenon is that the SS-25 may be covertly MIRVed. Evaluate the likelihood of this assessment in percentage probability. Please answer these questions assuming Soviet "altered practices" --no camouflage, concealment, and deception--- and an overt Soviet rail-mobile SS-24 ICBM deployment attempt. Please also answer these questions assuming the "altered practice" of covert or disguised "troop training" launches for the SS-24, and other indicators of deployment which could be concealed or disguised.

5. Submarine Detection Problems

When did the 3rd Delta IV SLBM submarine become SALT II-accountable?

a. When will the 4th Delta IV be SALT II-accountable?

b. When will the 5th Soviet Typhoon submarine become SALT II-accountable?

c. Has the U.S. ever failed to detect Soviet launch of SLBM submarines?

d. How long will it probably take for the U.S. to detect these events?

e. Are the Soviets using their CCD program to try to minimize our monitoring of thier submarine program?

f. Has the SS-N-17 SLBM ever been tested with a MIRV payload?

g. When the 5th Typhoon goes on sea trials, will the Soviets be over the 1200 MIRVed ICBM/SLBM launcher sublimit by 2 MIRVed launchers? Please answer these same questions assuming Soviet "altered practices" --no camouflage, concealment, and deception--for an overt deployment attempt.

6. SNDV and MIRV/ALCM Tables

It is essential that I be provided a detailed table showing as precisely as possible how the Soviets are violating the Soviet SNDV "ceiling" of SALT II --the 2,504 number of SNDVs that the Soviets had at the time of SALT II's signing on June 18, 1979. It is also essential that I be provided with tables showing possible current Soviet force levels for the MIRV/ALCM SALT II sublimits.

7. FRODs

Please describe the SALT II Functionally Related Observable Differences for the following intercontinental bombers:

- a. TU-95 Bear D
- b. TU-95 Bear F (TU-142)
- c. TU-95 Bear H
- d. B-1A, as distinguished from B-1B.
- e. Are all TU-95 Bear H counted as long range ALCM carriers, because there are FRODs (widened wing roots) between other TU-95 Bears, but no FRODs within the TU-95H sub-Class?
- f. Are all 5 Blackjack bombers counted as ALCM carriers, because long range ALCMs have been tested from the Blackjack, but there are no FRODs within the Blackjack class?
- g. Are there FRODs such as different wing roots, engine intakes, and cockpit windows to distinguish B-1As from B-1Bs? But are there no FRODs to distinguish B-1B ALCM carriers from B-1B non-ALCM carriers? Does this mean all B-1Bs should be SALT II-accountable as ALCM carriers?

8. Backfire As Long Range ALCM-Carrier

What evidence is there that the long-range AS-3 Kangaroo and new long range ALCMs were flight-tested from the Backfire bomber in the late 1970s?

9. SS-18 Fractionation

Because the Carter Administration was publicly concerned in 1978-1979 over whether the SS-18 was being tested with 14 warheads, and because reportedly the 1985 National Intelligence Estimate stated that SS-18s are deployed currently with 14 warheads, why has the U.S. not challenged excess fractionation of SS-18s at the SALT SCC, and made this issue part of the official reports to Congress? Is complete unanimity within the Intelligence Community required for

verification judgments about probably Soviet violations? If so, could this paralyze U.S. verification judgments?


10. Verification Studies

In 1979, the Carter Administration conducted a systematic study of the potential verifiability of the proposed SALT II Treaty, complete with cheating scenarios and confidence levels. But in 1982, the Director of ACDA notified the Senate that this SALT II verifiability study had not been updated and that there were no plans to update it.

- a. How verifiable was SALT II in retrospect?
- b. How verifiable is START/Umbrella/INF?
- c. Should this study be updated? Please provide us access to the study and access for cleared staff.

Thank you in advance for your prompt, unclassified answers to these urgent questions, which we intend to use on the Senate Floor in mid-July.

Sincerely,



Jesse Helms
U.S. Senator

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National Security Advisor to the President
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U.S.S.

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director
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Washington, D.C. 20505

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